




NUMBER 5 - 1982 (50) 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
JAPANESE LAW, SOCIETY AND 
POLITICS 
Lawrence W. Beer 















Occasional Papers/ Reprint Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
General Editor: Hungdah Chiu 
Executive Editor: David Salem 
Managing Editor: Shirley Lay 
Editorial Advisory Board 
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California 
at Berkeley 
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University 
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University 
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia 
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, University of Colorado 
Professor James Hsiung, New York University 
Dr. Robert Heuser, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public 
Law and International Law at Heidelberg 
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the 
Republic of China 
Professor K. P. Misra, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India 
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University 
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan 
Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society 
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to 
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law, 
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA. 
All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors. 
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, 
the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion 
contained therein. 
Subscription is US $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in 
the United States and Canada and $12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to 
OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu. 
Price for single copy of this issue: US $2.00 
© 1982 by Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. 
ISSN 0730-0107 
ISBN 0-942182-49-9 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN JAPANESE LAW, 
SOCIETY AND POLITICS* 
Lawrence W. Beer** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
The Two Modem Constitutional Revolutions ............... 1 [33] 
The Revision Controversy .................................. 5 [37] 
Japan's Constitutional Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 [44] 
Constitutional Culture and Law .......................... 14 [46] 
The Law of Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 [49] 
Some Aspects of Freedom for the 
Mass Media .............................................. 20 [52] 
Conclusion: Some Problems and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 [62] 
• Originally published in Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 16 (1982), No. I, pp. 33-67 
and copyrighted by Cambridge University Press, reprinted here with the permission of 
the author. Original page numbers of the paper appear in brackets. 
•• Fred Morgan Kirby Professorship of Civil Rights, Lafayette College, Easton, PA 
18042. 

Constitutional Revolution in Japanese 
Law, Society and Politics 
LAWRENCE W. BEER 
University of Colorado at Boulder, U.S.A. 
MoDERN Japan has experienced two constitutional revolutions, one 
from the latter half of the nineteenth century until I 945, and the other 
since I945· By 'constitutional revolution' is meant a long process in 
which a fundamental shift takes place in constitutional values diffused 
throughout society by means of law, administrative actions, judicial 
decisions, and education, both formal and informal. 
Previous to these modern constitutional revolutions, neo-Confu-
cianism, already well known and understood in I6oo, was adapted to 
produce what might be called the Tokugawa constitutional revolution. 1 
In contrast to this, the two modern constitutional revolutions were not 
precipitated by the maturing of internal forces over a long period. They 
were assimilative reactions to Western legal traditions. As a result, 
contemporary Japanese law blends traditional elements with European 
(especially German) civil law and legal theory, and Anglo-American 
common law traditions. 
In this article I offer some data and reflections on (I) prewar and 
present Japanese constitutionalism and the revision debate; (2) legal 
culture, embracing the legal system and values, as related to such issues 
as freedom of expression; and (3) some pending problems in Japanese 
constitutional law. 
The Two Modern Constitutional Revolutions 
Pre-I945 concepts of constitutionalism and law affect legal interpre-
tation and debate today. Many leading judges, prosecutors, legal 
1 David M. Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan (Seattle: University ofW ashington Press, 
1964); John Fairbank et al., A History of East Asian Civilization--East Asia: The Great 
Tradition (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1g6o); and Dan Fenno Henderson, Conciliation and 
Japanese Law: Tokugawa and Modern, 2 vols (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1g68), vol. I. 
(1) 
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scholars and lawyers have had to straddle mentally two constitutional 
eras, and received much of their formative training and experience 
under the pre-I945 legal system. The Meiji constitutional revolution 
(I868-I945) 2 institutionalized the system against which much of the 
post-I945 constitutional system has been a reaction, but also laid the 
foundation for aspects of the post- I 945 revolution. 
Study of the law, administrative practice and police developments 
affecting freedom of expression between I 868 and I 945 suggests that 
most parts of a thorough system for restraining free speech had fallen 
into place by I9I3 after piecemeal development, and that enforcement 
of the Peace Preservation Law of I925 and subsequent related law 
brought a final touch of unusual sophistication to the pre-I945 system of 
control, for which the military were not as responsible as sometimes 
assumed. 3 Neither the legal system nor traditional culture seems to have 
honored individual rights, as rights came to be understood inJapanese 
law under Western influence. 
Rights and freedoms were quite new concepts in Meiji Japan. 
However, the absence in Japan of a long and coherent tradition of 
liberalism does not imply that the Meiji constitutional revolution did 
not vastly expand pre-existing group tendencies to assertion for and 
against policies in accord with their sense ofjustice and self-interest.4 In 
general, the maintenance of civil liberties in a country does not depend 
on explicit emphasis in law or society upon rights and freedoms, as 
understood in the law and intellectual traditions of the West, but on: (I) 
a mixture of institutionalized values which taken together favor liberty; 
( 2) the existence of competitive, as opposed to authoritarian, politics; (3) 
actual expression of agreement or dissent on substantive issues along 
with the possibility of dissent with impunity; (4) such a balance of social 
2 Dan Fenno Henderson, 'Law and Political Modernization in japan,' in Robert E. 
Ward (ed.), Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton: University Press, 1968); 
and Hideo Tanaka (ed.), assisted by Malcolm D. H. Smith, The Japanese Legal System 
(Toyko: University ofTokyo Press, 1976), pp. 194-253. For a concise historical analysis 
of rights in the West, see Richard P. Claude, 'The Classical Model of Human Rights 
Development,' in Richard P. Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 6-so. 
3 Y asuhiro Okudaira, Political Censorship in Japan, 1931-1945 (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Law School Library, 1962), esp. pp. 1-50. 
4 Probably the most valuable compilation of detailed studies and official trial records 
of group political actions in japan from the 186os till the Pacific War isSeiji saiban shiroku, 
5 vols (Daiichi Hoki, 1969-70 ), edited by Daiichi Hoki publishing co. An additional five 
volumes on recent decades were published in 1980. These studies amply illustrate 
preferences for group, as opposed to individual, assertiveness, and for other traditional 
values (referred to later in this paper) which antedated but are not integrated with 
Western legal ideas of justice. 
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and political forces that those favoring rights outweigh those opposed. 5 
The sociological interplay of such factors in Japan from the 186os 
through the 1930s resulted in a growing awareness of individual legal 
rights, as understood today inJapanese and Western law, among many 
scholars, officials and other citizens at the same time that a modern 
system of political repression was being refined and increasingly 
enforced in service to the Emperor. 
The constitutional system of Japan today, reflecting a quite different 
interplay of factors, stresses enforcement of individual rights. The 
present widespread acceptance of the constitution in Japan rests in part 
on a continuing reaction against a prewar system that failed in the 
mind-numbing defeat of the Second World War. It does not seem 
probable that Japan would soon have become a constitutional demo-
cracy without the shock of losing the Pacific War and without massive 
Occupation support for Japan's liberal forces. 6 Modern political 
systems which are systematically authoritarian, whether left or right in 
orientation and however inefficient in light of abstract goals, appear 
much simpler to maintain as regimes than constitutional democracies. 
Japan's authoritarian apparatus, by comparative standards, was 
efficient in its methods of political control during the militarist period, 
and not likely to evolve along more liberal lines. 
The widespread, deep, and genuine loyalty to the emperor-nation of 
that earlier era is not much discussed in public today, and is perhaps 
remembered more often with embarrassment than with pride. The 
rejection now of significant military power under the pacifist provisions 
of Article 9 7 and the denial of power to the Emperor under Chapter 18 of 
5 William Spinrad, Civil Liberties (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 5-26, 
292-306. See Okudaira, Political Censorship in Japan; Richard Mitchell, Thought Control in 
Prewar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976); and Patricia Steinhoff, 'Legal 
Control of Ideology in Prewar Japan,' unpublished paper, International Congress of 
Orientalists, Canberra, Australia, 1970. 
6 See Legal Reforms in Japan during the Allied Occupation, special reprint volume, 
Washington Law Review, 1977. 
7 
'Article 9· Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
'2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency 
of the state will not be recognized.' The Constitution of Japan, in Itoh and Beer, The 
Constitutional Case Law of Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), p. 258. 
According to Chalmers johnson, the japanese senryoku, the usual japanese translation of 
war potential in paragraph 2 of Article g, is a mistranslation, as senryoku means fighting 
power or strength, something more limited than war potential. The constitution does 
not, therefore, limit senbi or gunbi which have the wider meaning implied in war 
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the constitution seem intimatejy linked in theJ apanese mind to the utter 
national failure resulting from total and militant loyalty to the Emperor. 
Just as prewar children were programmatically indoctrinated in kokutai 
ideology, so postwar children have been conditioned systematically to 
believe in freedom ever since the first student was required to memorize 
the new constitution during the Occupation (I 945-52). 9 The shock of 
those who had believed unquestioningly in the invincibility of the nation 
under the Emperor, although profound, is as difficult to convey to 
today's youth as it is to make real to America's affluent youth the 
depression years. 
Closely associated in the collective memory of the 'militarist period' is 
the severe, even irrational, limitation of the freedom of thought, the 
freedom of expression, and other individual rights. The radical postwar 
rejection by the overwhelming majority of the prewar military-bureau-
cratic system, which is seen as having misused the imperial institution for 
its own ends, explains in part why efforts to alter notably the status of 
Japan's Self-Defense Forces, or the Emperor, or individual rights are 
perceived by many liberal and leftistjapanese as an attempt to rip apart 
the entire fair fabric of the I 94 7 constitution, and not simply as an 
attempt to modify one of its elements. Whether or not this perception 
represents a persuasive assessment of relationships, the three parts are 
commonly seen as crucial and inseparable; no other components of the 
new constitutional structure arouse such noteworthy emotion. More 
power to the Emperor would mean, it is thought, more power to the 
military which would mean expanded police powers and less democratic 
freedom; and conversely, strict limitation of imperial and military 
functions in government is necessary to assure the maintenance and 
development of constitutional rights. In sum, the term 'Peace Constitu-
tion' is used injapan as a reference to the anti-militarist provisions of the 
constitution, its guarantee of individual rights, and imperial powerless-
ness. 
potential, and which, owing to japan's industrial potential, is considerable. C. Johnson, 
'Omote (Explicit) and Ura (Implicit): Translating japanese Political Terms,' Journal of 
Japanese Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1980), p. 114. 
8 
'Article 4· The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are 
provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.' 
Ibid., p. 257. 
9 Lawrence W. Beer, 'Education, Politics and Freedom of Expression in japan: the 
Ienaga Textbook Review Cases,' Law in Japan: An Annual, Vol. 8 (1975), 67-go; Ronald 
Suleski, 'A New Generation of japanese Intellectuals,' Japan Foundation Newsletter, 6, No. 
4 (October-November, 1978), pp. ID-12. 
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The Revision Controversy 
The Constitution of Japan has not been amended even once, as the 
constitutional revolution of postwar Japan has continued to take root. 
As it has been applied, it seems sufficiently flexible to remove any 
pressing need for amendment. The Meiji Constitution was never 
amended, unless the establishment of the present constitution is viewed 
technically as a constitutional amendment. 10 The aspects of perception 
described above seem a critical factor underlying the seriousness of 
academic, legal and political debate on questions of constitutional 
interpretation and revision over the past thirty years. A litmus test 
applied to scholars and politicians, as well as to laws and judicial 
decisions on many issues is how they relate to the tripartite revision issue. 
So thoroughly integrated into political and legal rhetoric is this 
constitutional sensitivity that court cases concerning a wide range of 
subjects-for example, history textbook certification, academic free-
dom, demonstrations, the rating of teachers, and the Japan-United 
States Security Treaty- have evoked references to all aspects of the 
tripartite image of Emperor, military, and individual rights. 
Once the Allied Occupation ended in I952, the revision controversy 
gathered momentum and reached a peak during the mid- and 
late-I950s following the formation of the Liberal-Democratic Party 
(LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party USP) by coalitions of smaller 
parties. Some powerful LDP leaders wanted revision precisely to 
strengthen the positions of the Emperor and the military and to limit 
individual rights; but this does not mean a widespread desire existed in 
the LDP for a return to the political system of the wartime period from 
the Manchurian Incident (I 93 I) till late I 945, during which period 
bureaucrats and militarists decisively replaced elected party politicians 
as top leaders of the government. 11 
10 The Constitution of japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and went into 
effect on May 3, 1947· The amendment provision in The Constitution of the Empire of 
Japan was as follows: 'Article 73· When it has become necessary in future to amend the 
provisions of the present Constitution, a project to the effect shall be submitted to the 
Imperial Diet by Imperial Order. 
'2. In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not less than 
two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be 
passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members present is obtained.' 
Tanaka, Japanese Legal System, p. 23. 
11 On the history of the revision controversy, see Haruhiro Fukui, 'The Liberal 
Democratic Party and Constitutional Revision,' in David Sissons ( ed.), Papers on Modern 
Japan (Canberra: Australian University Press, 1968), and 'Twenty Years of Revi-
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At least six factors seem to have virtually eliminated the probability of 
wholesale constitutional revision in Japan's near future, assuming no 
severe economic upheaval: 
(I) The Security Treaty Crisis of I 960 seems to have been more of a 
community rite affirming consensual democracy than an anti-treaty or 
revolutionary struggle. 12 It was the largest mass movement inJapanese 
history, 13 and it may well have suggested to LDP leaders such as Prime 
Minister Ikeda Hayato that an effort at major constitutional change, 
whether needed or not, would awaken organized opposition on a much 
grander scale than that of I 960. 
(2) The Sunagawa Decision of the Supreme Court14 spoke ofJapan's 
natural right of self-defense and held Japan's cooperation and security 
treaty with the United States to be constitutional under Article 9· This 
decision may have reduced the revisionists' sense of urgency about 
revision for the sake of Japan's military security. The present Security 
Treaty of I96o was similarly upheld by the Supreme Court on April 2, 
I96g. 15 Two other aspects of Japan's politics tend to support Article g's 
anti-militarism and Article 66-2, a constitutional requirement that 'the 
Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians.' First, 
over 8o percent of the Japanese people support Article 9 and the 
Security Treaty; 57 percent favor maintaining the Self-Defense Forces 
at present levels, while only I9 percent support an increase in military 
sionism,' in Dan Fenno Henderson (ed.), The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty rears 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969}, pp. 41-70; and Reinhard Neumann, 
The lnaba Affair, Constitution Day and Constitutional Revision,' Law in Japan: An 
Annual, Vol. 9 (1976}, pp. 129-43. 
12 Max Gluckman's distinction between 'rituals of rebellion' and 'revolution' may 
apply to the 196o Security Treaty Crisis and to some aspects of the University Crisis of 
1969. Revolution seeks to overthrow the whole existing order, while ritual rebellion, 
which may be a luxury limited to societies like Japan with a stable established order, 
reaffirm the system in venting tensions between leaders and led and between viewpoints. 
In this connection, see Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa and Politics, Law, and 
Ritual in Tribal Society; and Takeo Doi Uohn Bester, trans.), Anatomy of Dependence 
(Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1973). 
13 On the Security Treaty Crisis, see George R. Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The 
Security Treaty Crisis of IgOO (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Richard 
Rabinowitz, 'Law and the Social Process inJapan,' The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of 
Japan, Third Series, Vol. 10 ( 1968): 54-71 ;John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, 
Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1962). 
14 Japan v. Sakata, 23 Keishu 3225 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, December 16, 1959). For a 
translation, see John M. Maki ( ed. }, Court and Constitution in Japan (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1964}, pp. 298-361. 
15 Japanv. Sakaneetal., 13 Keishu (No.5) 685 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench,April2, 1969). 
A translation appears in Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, pp. 103-30. 
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strength; and very few Japanese exhibit a sense of external military 
threat. 16 Most feel there are greater internal than external threats to the 
system, and even internal threats are minimal. Second, Article 9 has 
operated in such a way that the military has been removed from the 
political drama, and, barring an unforeseeable crisis, this has negated 
the possibility of a military coup d'etat in Japan. If Japan had a 
conventional constitution, without Article 9, a strong military, what-
ever its political alignments, would have at its disposal the instruments of 
coercion which,] apanese history suggests, it would not be reticent to use 
politically. 
(3) The issuance in I 964, under the leadership of Professor Taka-
yanagi Kenzo, of a non-committal final report by the Commission on 
the Constitution (I 95 7-64; Kenpo Chosakai) also discouraged further 
revision efforts, at least for some time. No recommendations for 
amendment were made after six years of hearings, study, and debate. 17 
From its inception, many critics viewed the Commission as a revisionist 
tool; if such was the original intent of the LDP, it was frustrated. Many 
scholars and politicians refused to participate in or support the 
Commission's activities. Whether their participation would have added 
even greater force to the Commission's final refusal to recommend 
changes is a moot point. In any case, many opponents of the 
Commission were actively involved in parallel study groups, which 
included Commission members, during the long debate over every 
important and technical provision of the Constitution of Japan. In its 
function, this debate may be viewed as a Japanese-style constitutional 
convention, with long consultations at home and abroad, and widespread 
debates in pursuit of national consensus. japan had had no opportunity 
for such a 'convention' under the Occupation. 
(4) In the late I 940s and early I 950s, food, clothing, and other basic 
needs were the preoccupations of most, leaving a small minority to 
16 See the opinion poll survey reports in Asahi Shinbun, November I, I978 and january 
I, I979· 
17 Kenz6 Takayanagi Oohn Maki, trans.), 'The Conceptual Background of the 
Constitutional Revision Debate in the Constitution Investigation Commission,' Law in 
Japan: An Annual, Vol. I ( I967): I-24; Robert E. Ward, 'The Commission on the 
Constitution in the Prospects of Consti tu tiona! Change inj a pan,' Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 24 ( I965): 401-3o;john M. Maki, 'The Documents of japan's Commission on the 
Constitution,' Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24 ( 1965): 475-89; and the final report of the 
Commission on the Constitution, Kenpo Chosakai J-IOkokusho ( OkurashO/nsatsukyoku, I 964). 
For commentaries, see J-IOritsu Jiho 419 (August, 1964): 363-74, and Jurisuto 303 
(August, I964): Io-26. A study group, Kenpo Mondai Kenkyukai, opposing the 
Commission on the Constitution, Kenpo Chosakai J-IOkokusho ( OkurashO/nsatsukyoku, I 964). 
lwanami Shoten, I964). 
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debate ideologies and constitutional ideas. The postwar revolution of 
thought had a slow start. By far the most frequently cited reason in I 979 
for Japan's peace since World War II was 'the personally experienced 
misery of war,' 18 and popular support for the 'peace constitution' is 
perhaps equally attributable to that experience, at least initially. The 
fact is that popular assimilation and support for the constitution has 
grown, and militates strongly against revision. This has been primarily 
the result of education, accumulating experience of the operation of the 
constitution, prosperity, the absence of any appealing alternative, the 
work of the Commission on the Constitution, and the long-term absence 
of a perceived external military threat. 
(5) The LDP lost in the late I 96os and I 970s the overwhelming 
parliamentary power necessary to revise the constitution. This, and 
factional differences within the LDP render revision very unlikely. 
Inside and outside the political parties, Japan has many power centers, 
groups organized along relatively non-authoritarian, quasi-familial 
lines. A few such centers seem dominant-such as the ruling political 
party, the Ministries (especially the Finance Ministry), the judiciary, 
mass media combines, and industry federations-with lesser interest 
groups or domains filling out the system. In general, loyalty to the small 
face-to-face group is primary, 19 and it is quite common for such groups 
or factions to be in competition with, or at best indifferent to, the others. 
But they can also freely enter into alliances of mutual benefit, usually for 
limited periods and for particular purposes. This often happens, for 
example, among factions of the LDP, and this capacity for making and 
breaking alliances makes the system dynamic and highly organized. But 
a consensus within the LDP to revise the constitution is certainly not 
readily foreseeable, and cooperation with other political parties is much 
more unlikely. The distribution of seats in the Diet remains fairly stable, 
the LDP's capacity to retain control of the Diet being primarily due 
to the absence of an alternative appealing to the voters. In July I98o, 
even after an atypical LDP landslide victory, the LDP's 286 seats out 
of 5 I I in the lower house and I 35 of 252 in the upper house20 are far 
18 Asahi Shinbun, November I, I978 and january I, I979· 
19 Such loyalty is especially emphasized among white collar workers. See Sepp 
Linhart, Arbeit, Frei;:.eit und Familie in Japan, with a summary in English (Weisbaden: 
Otto Harrassowitz, I976), and Thomas Rohlen, For Harmony and Strength, Japanese 
White-Collar Organization in Anthropological Perspective (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, I 974). • 
20 The distribution of seats in both Houses of the Diet injuly I98o was as below. For 
perspective, statistics after the prior two lower house elections and the last upper house 
election are included. The sudden jump in LDP strength in I98o was attendant to the 
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short of the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. 21 
(6) Also militating against constitutional revision is the institutiona-
lization of the Constitution ofjapan through law and judicial decisions. 
The district, high and Supreme Courts of Japan have been much too 
diverse in their ideological leanings and interpretive methods to allow 
blanket characterizations of judicial performance since 194 7 with 
respect to constitutional law. But the net cumulative effect of their work 
in millions of cases, civil, criminal and administrative, has significantly 
strengthened the roots of rule of law democracy in Japanese soil. 22 In 
unexpected death of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi on June 12 during the election 
campaign. Voter turnout on June 22 was the highest since 1960, 74·57%, as citizens 
rallied around the strongest party and, perhaps, honored the deceased by supporting his 
party, especially candidates of factions allied with Ohira. See Asahi Shinbun,June 23-26, 
1980. 
House of House of 
Representatives Councilors 
Party 1980 '979 1976 1980 1977 
LDP 286 253 254 135 125 
JSP 107 107 118 47 53 
llomeito 34 s8 s6 27 28 
Democratic Socialist Party 33 36 28 12 II 
Japan Communist Party 29 41 19 12 16 
New Liberal Club 12 4 17 2 5 
Shaminren 3 2 3 2 3 
Independents 7 10 6 14 4 
Vacancies 10 2 
511 511 511 252 247 
In the 1970s, independents usually joined with the LDP, thus assuring it a parliamen-
tary majority. The New Liberal Club is a moderate conservative group which split off 
from the LDP in the mid-1970s, but often votes with it. 
21 The Constitution of Japan, Article 96: 
'Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring 
vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be 
submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a 
majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet 
shall specify. 
'2. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor 
in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.' ltoh and Beer, 
Constitutional Cas! Law of Japan, p. 268. 
22 Lawrence W. Beer, 'Nihon no saibankan,' Jurisuto, no. 700, September 15, '979· 
Annually, HOso Jiho (Hosokai) publishes authoritative statistical reports on cases dealt 
with by the courts, and HOritsu Jiho (Nihon Hyoronsha) carries reviews of both 
constitutional case law and constitutional studies (kenpogaku). Although the Supreme 
Court's share in the judicial caseload is only a small fraction of the whole, by the end of 
1977, it had 'taken cognizance of 183,496 cases, out of which 1,045 cases were referred to 
the Grand Bench [by petty benches], and in 263 cases the Court declared a law, order, 
regulation or official act unconstitutional.' Justice in Japan (Tokyo: Supreme Court of 
Japan, 1978), p. 19. 
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addition, family courts, Civil Liberties Commissioners, and Local 
Administrative Counselors have also brought the law of the constitution 
to bear in resolving millions of disputes in a quiet atmosphere. 23 District 
courts more often than appellate courts24 have stressed civil liberties in 
their findings; but even the now conservative Supreme Court has 
notably nurtured proc~dural rights of the accused 25 while allowing 
creeping restraints on the .rights of public employees, on and off the 
job. 26 (Other examples are discussed later.) The courts are restrained by 
an insufficiency of judges, dilatory trial proceedings, jurisprudence that 
is sometimes restrictive, and other factors touched on later. In general, 
the courts have guarded jealously their tradition since the Meiji 
period 27 of judicial independence in deciding individual cases; they 
have also upheld their institutional prerogatives in dealing with the Diet 
and administrators. 
Legal professionals as well as politicians, ranging from rightists to 
moderate liberals to democratic socialists to those who view Marxists as 
rank conservatives, seem cautious about the intentions of their political 
23 Family courts, summary courts, and various modes oflay participation in dispute 
resolution are briefly described in Justice in Japan. pp. 14-17, 23-6. Concerning the Civil 
Liberties Bureau and Commissioners, see Lawrence W. Beer and C. G. Weeramantry, 
'Human Rights in Japan: Some Protections and Problems,' Universal Human Rights, No. 
3, 1979, pp. I-33· 
24 Concerning Japan's court system and judges, see Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case 
Law of Japan, pp. 7-21, 25o-5; and, on barriers to civil litigation, John Owen Haley, 
'The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,' Journal of Japanese Studies, (summer, 1978): 
359-go. In Japanese, Wada Hideo, Saiko saibansho ron (Nihon Hyoronsha, 1970), and 
Saiko saibansho (Hogaku seminah-Nihon Hyoronsha, 1977). 
25 For example, Abe v. Japan, 20 Keishu (No.6) 537 (Sup. Ct., Second Petty Bench, 
July 1, 1966), translated in ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 167-8. 
26 See, for example, Japan v. O<.awa, 28 Keishu (No. g) 393 (Supreme Court, Grand 
Bench, November 6, 1974); for comments, see Lawrence W. Beer, 'Recent Develop-
ments-Constitutional Law,' Law in Japan: An Ann!Ull, Vol. 8 (1975): 205-8, and 
Nobushige Ukai, 'The Significance of the Reception of American Constitutional 
Institutions and Ideas in Japan,' in L. W. Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 123-6. See generally 'Kenpo 
no soten,' Jurisuto <.okan (May, 1978); 'Nihonkoku kenpo,' Jurisuto rinji <.okan, 638 (May, 
1977); 'Kenpo 30nen no riron to tenbo,' HOritsu Jiho rinji <.okan (May 1977); Kobayashi 
Naoki, Kenpo hand"an no genri, 2 vols (Nihon Hyoronsha, 1978); and Ashibe Nobuyoshi 
(ed.), Kenpo (Yiihikaku, 1978), Vol. 2. 
21 The Otsu Case (1891) and the Meiji Constitution established judicial indepen-
dence for the first time in Japan. As Kenzo Takayanagi notes: 'In a sense, the Otsu 
Incident and its legacy contradict the basic thesis advanced by the Western scholars 
interviewed by Kaneko: the inclusion in the Constitution of~n institution quite foreign 
to the Japanese scene provided the foundation on which a tradition of judicial 
independence very quickly emerged.' Takayanagi, supra n. 17. See also Marc Galanter, 
'The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India,' Journal of Social Issues 24 
( 1968): 65-g~. 
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foes on the revision issue. It is more a debate among elites who would 
speak on behalf of the citizenry than an issue like economics or education 
preoccupying the public in general. Many Japanese of otherwise 
differing views would like the revision controversy to cool down 
sufficiently to allow a complete rewriting of the Constitution of Japan 
into appropriateJapanese language without changing the intent of any 
important provision. That may of course be an impossible dream; but 
the present translation into Japanese of some parts originally in English 
is not adequate, and may be an unnecessary reminder of the document's 
Occupation-period origins. 28 
Some anti-revisionists maintain the LDP policies and the decisions 
of conservative courts have already revised the constitution in fact, if 
not formally, in pursuit of a 'reverse course' preference for the prewar 
order. 29 Surely, in Japan as in past and present democratic law and 
politics the world over, one can find much evidence of an abiding 
preference for anti-democratic policies and judicial decisions at both the 
official and private levels of society; but the contention that substantive 
constitutional revision has occurred seems a doubtful political judgment 
and an oversimplification of the tasks of courts in Japan, unless by 
'revision' one really means 'interpretation' which one finds needlessly 
restrictive. Moreover, the problems in interpreting the Article 9 'no war 
clause' are unprecedented in world judicial history; they cannot be 
solved or whisked away by too facile a use of'political question' doctrine, 
the view in law that courts have no right to decide certain politically 
sensitive issues such as those affecting national security. 30 
Japan's power centers criticize each other for wrong-headedness 
regarding the constitution, and in doing so they manifest the competi-
tive politics essential to the maintenance of liberties. Anti-revisionists 
retain sensitivity to the repressive past and show awareness that 
democracy is a vulnerable system oflaw and government always in some 
respects in tension with its professed ideals. 
2
ij See Tanaka (ed.), Japanese Legal System, pp. 642-85 and works cited therein. 
29 A good presentation of these views is Reinhard Neumann, 'The lnaba Affair, 
Constitution Day and Constitutional Revision,' supra, n. 1 1. 
30 Hiroshi ltoh, 'Judicial Decision-making in the Japanese Supreme Court,' Law in 
Japan: An Annual, vol. 3 (1969): 128-61; Kisaburo Yokota, 'Political Questions and 
Judicial Review,' Henderson (ed.), Constitution of Japan, pp. 141-66; Hideo Wada, 
'Decisions under Article 9 of the Constitution: The Sunakawa, Eniwa, Naganuma 
Decisions,' Law in Japan: An Annual9 ( 1 976): 1 1 7-28; 'Recent Developments,' ibid~ 153; 
Robert L. Seymour, 'Japan's Self-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implications,' 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47 { 1974-75): 421; and Kenneth M. Tagawa, JusticiabiliryandJudicial 
Power in Japan, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1979. 
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Japan's Constitutional Theory 
The Constitution ofJapan is now the most-authoritative reference point 
for public values in Japan and is, as Edward Seidensticker has noted, 
'among the Sacred Books of the East. ' 31 The constitution's theoretical 
thrust is based on natural law suppositions and on the attribution of 
intrinsic value to the individual person. So many formal philosophies 
and ideologies co-exist inJ a pan's political and intellectual worlds that it 
is hard to discern any agreed-upon general theory underpinning 
Japanese constitutional democracy. Among the pillars and struts of 
Japanese thought are traditional ideas drawn from Buddhism, Confu-
cianism and Shinto, as well as theories related to Christianity and 
Marxism; but how they relate to each other, if at all, is elusive. 32 But it is 
clear that customary law has had a powerful influence. Though 
generally unwritten, these rules are partially expressed in such docu-
ments as company rules. 33 A sophisticated syste~ of rules with effective 
sanctions governs oyabun-kobun (quasi-parental-filial) group structures34 
and gives specificity to such motive forces as amae (reciprocal depen-
dency)35 and loyalty. Nagao Ryiiichi suggests that a better understand-
ing of the enigmatic urge to absolute loyalty-not simply to loyalty-
may be a key to understanding the history of Japanese social and 
political ideas. 36 
Every five years the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo 
conducts comprehensive surveys of Japanese national character. The 
results indicate that there has been no appreciable modification of a 
clear Japanese preference for traditional values since 1 953· Among the 
possible approaches to clarifying the principles underpinning or at 
31 Edward Seidensticker, 'Japan After Vietnam,' Commentary (September, 1976): 56. 
32 Gino Piovesana, Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought (Tokyo: Enderle Bookstore, 
1961); Charles A. Moore (ed.), The Japanese Mind (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 
1968); Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Kenpo (Yiihikaku, 1962). 
33 Carl Steenstrup, 'The Company Code,' Asian Law Forum, Vol. I (1976): 21-5. 
34 Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1970). 
35 The term 'reciprocal dependency' is taken from Douglas D. Mitchell, Amae: The 
Expression of Reciprocal Dependency Needs in Japanese Politics and Law (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1976). Mitchell seems to this writer to present Takeo Doi's important 
views on dependency more systematically and more clearly than Doi himself. See also 
Takeo Doi, Anatomy of Dependence. 
36 Ryiiichi Nagao, in a review of R. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), in Law in Japan: An Annual 5 
( 1972): 224. A comparative study of the meanings and objects of loyalty would be very 
helpful as a step toward clarifying the bases of intercultural disagreements. 
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variance with the constitution is analysis of the reasons given by voters 
for their voting preferences. An attitude study of I ,500 Tokyo voters was 
made in I978 by a team ofjapanese scholars. 37 Analysis indicated that 
ideology and party preference were relatively unimportant. The single 
most important determinant of political choice (the key factor to 29 
percent of voters, and a major factor to 53 percent) 38 was the image of 
the candidate as expressing and supporting traditional values and what 
might be termed 'the good Japanese way' of doing things. But a most 
striking contrast to this preference for traditionalism in the personal style 
of candidates is found in the analysis of the positive elements in the 
images which voters entertained ofliberalism, capitalism, socialism, and 
communism: the most likely to succeed were candidates, ideologies, and 
parties presenting an image of flexibility, modernity, conservatism, and 
economic egalitarianism somehow combined. For maximum legiti-
macy, a leader was seen as combining great respect for traditional values 
and modes of human interaction with concern for constitutional 
freedoms and economic policies promoting equality. Forty-two percent 
of the voters studied considered themselves entirely unaffected by 
political ideologies such as the four above; only I percent consider· 
socialism-communism preferable in general to liberalism-capitalism, 
but only IO percent rate the latter pairing preferable to the former. 
Along with the strong support for Article 9 pacifism (not a general 
philosophy of pacifism) referred to earlier, values such as hierarchy, 
equality, groupism, freedom and loyalty form at least part of the 
structure of operative constitutional theory in japan. Replacing in some 
measure and without much emotion their earlier loyalty to the 
Emperor, perhaps the generality of japanese now share a loyalty to the 
37 Hayashi Chikio et at., Nipponjin no kokuminsei (Shiseido, 1970); and Hayashi Chikio, 
'Seiji ishiki no seitai,' Asahi Shinbun, December 16, 1978, p. 4· See also the comprehensive 
survey report in Asahi Shinbun,January 1, 1979, pp. 1, Io-13. 
The term 'feudal,' often used pejoratively to criticize traditional aspects of modern 
Japan, is usually applied to factors such as the family system which predated feudalism 
by centuries and which made japanese feudalism different from other feudalisms such as 
those of Western Europe. See F. Joiion des Longrais, L'est et /'ouest, institutions du Japon et 
de /'occident comparees (Paris and Tokyo, 1958). This writer does not share a uniformly 
negative view of Japanese-style.'feudalism' as it functions today. 
38 Hayashi, 'Seiji ishiki no seitai.' Only a small percentage (c. 20%) of japanese 
expressed much trust in politicians in late 1978 compared, for example, to tax officials (c. 
45 %) , judges, teachers, police, doctors, newspapers, and weather forecasters, among 
whom the last in the ascending order were the most trusted. Asahi Shinbun, October 22, 
1978 andj anuary 1, '979· My only explanation for the extraordinary trust offorecllSters 
is good-humored japanese stress on distrust of other categories. Newspapers are trusted 
institutions, but the results may have been skewed to their advantage by the fact that the 
newspapers did the polling. 
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constitution, not as a formal document, but as a summation of preferred 
values and guidelines for public action. What the constitution rejects 
seems as important as the rights it guarantees, but the whole structure 
rests on a recognition of the equal dignity of each individual. As the late 
constitutional lawyer Miyazawa Toshiyoshi once expressed it, while 
contrasting prewar and postwar Japan, 'Every day I enjoy breathing 
freedom again.' 
Constitutional Culture and Law 
The core new element in post-I945Japanese constitutionalism is legally 
protected freedom and individual rights, based primarily on the 
Preamble and Chapter III (Articles IO to 40) of the constitution. 39 
Japan would very likely be a well-organized (some might say, 
over-organized) nation under almost any imaginable governmental 
system; but much was added to order by the present constitutional 
revolution. The Preamble proclaims that 'sovereign power resides with 
the people,' and Article I 3 that 'all of the people shall be respected as 
individuals.' This abstract latter provision has been invoked by the 
courts as the textual basis for both establishing and limiting certain 
constitutional rights. The individual person has replaced the Emperor 
as the highest public value. The Emperor is a 'symbol of the State and of 
the unity of the people' (Article I); and 'he shall not have powers related 
to government' (Article 4). This is the first time the powers of the 
Emperor have ever been legally limited, although historically he 
seldom, and, since I 868, almost never, actually exercised any political 
powers. Although continuities do exist which link present and prewar 
institutions, significant changes have been made in their organization 
and function. 40 The Cabinet has no military membership and is 
collectively responsible to the Diet (Article 66). Constitutional rights, 
although in fact sometimes subordinate to informal in-group pressures 
39 The Constitution of Japan, Article 97 in the 'Supreme Law' chapter of the constitution 
reads: 'The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of 
Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many 
exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, 
to be held for all time inviolate.' 
40 On the severe limitations on the emperor's political role as an individual in the 
Tokugawa period ( 16oo--1868), see Herschel Webb, The Japanese Imperial Institution in the 
Tokugawa Period (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), and for the period 
1868-1946, see David A. Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974), and Modem Asian Studies, 14,4 (198o), p. 529. 
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and bureaucratic presumptions, are more freely exercised than in 
prewar Japan, vastly expanded in scope, usually honored by the police, 
and justiciable or conciliable in public tribunals.41 The mass media 
serve more adequately than before as a quasi-constitutional Fourth 
Estate, a power center relatively independent of any political party or 
Ministry, without which Japanese democracy might crumble.42 The 
Diet is the 'highest organ of State power' (Article 41) except for the 
ruling political party, yet subject to judicial review (Article 81) of the 
constitutionality of its official acts.43 The court system, supervised by the 
Supreme Court, is judicially and administratively independent. Finally, 
the status of women has improved markedly, in both fact and law.44 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have the 'power to determine 
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act';45 but 
like most court systems, they exercise this power against other branches 
of government only rarely. They are further restrained by predo-
minantly civil law perceptions of the judicial role in government, a role 
of democratic deference to the elected parliament.46 The technical effect 
41 Regarding the police, who enjoy considerable public respect and trust in japan, see 
David H. Bayley, Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976). 
Takayanagi Kenzo noted that prewar debates on constitutionality involved political 
rhetoric, but rarely justiciable rights; supra, n. 32. 'Conciliable rights' is meant to express 
the prevalent style of dispute resolution, involving a third-party status bearer (informal 
or official) pursuing compromise and formal harmony. OnJ apanese right consciousness, 
see Lawrence W. Beer, 'Freedom of Expression injapan with Comparative Reference to 
the United States,' in Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights, pp. 101-9; Henderson, 
Conciliation and Japanese Law. 
42 Discussions in 1978 and 1979 with Ito Masami and Shimizu Hideo. They consider 
press freedom more critical to democracy in Japan than in most countries. 
43 The Constitution of Japan, 'Article 81. The Supreme Court is the court oflast resort 
with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official 
act.' Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 266. Lower courts, by judicial 
decision and Article 76, also have the power of judicial review. 
44 Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan.' 
45 Article 81 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 76 is also critical: 'The whole judicial 
power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law. 
'2. No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the 
Executive be given final judicial power. 
'All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound 
only by this Constitution and the laws.' Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 
265. 
For a study of the prewar administrative court system, to which paragraph 2 of Article 
76 is in part a reaction, see Hideo Wada, 'The Administrative Court under the Meiji 
Constitution,' Law in Japan: An Annual 10 (1977): 1-64. 
46 For comparative perspectives, see Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia; lvo 
Duchacek, 'Constitutions: Adapting to Change,' Power Maps: Comparative Politics of 
Constitutions (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1973), pp. 2 1o--32; Claude, Comparative 
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on future law of a judgment of unconstitutionality is still debated, but a 
'conclusion in a decision of a superior court shall bind courts below in 
respect of the case concerned,' and not in general.47 For example, if a 
legal provision is held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, it is 
nevertheless possible that the same or other courts may rule differently in 
other cases on the same issue, and it is possible that the Diet will not pass 
remedial legislation to remove the offending provision. A judgment of 
unconstitutionality does not necessarily trigger among lawyers, legal 
scholars, mass media leaders or politicians the requisite sustained 
pressure on the Diet to take legislative action to support such a 
judgment.48 If the judicial decision is that an official action is invalid, no 
court doctrine has resolved the scholarly debate on whether some legal 
provision enables a court to order an administrative agency to take 
remedial action.49 Article 37 of the constitution guarantees the accused 
in a criminal case 'the right to a speedy and public trial'; but some 
controversial cases have languished in the courts for a decade or even 
two (e.g., the 1952 May Day Incident decisions of the 1970s), and years 
of delay are commonplace. Widely spaced trial sessions characterize 
Japan's civil law system, courts have been used at times as political 
forums, causing additional delays, and judges are generally meticulous 
in moving slowly towards a decision. These factors may constitute a 
systematic obstacle to quick justice. 
The conviction rate in Japan is extremely high, approaching 99 
percent. But in recent years criminological reasons, rather than 
insufficient evidence have led prosecutors not to prosecute around 40 
percent of serious violations of the Criminal Code. A lay Inquest of 
Prosecution regularly reviews a prosecutor's determinations on whether 
or not to file charges; these organs recommend a change or indictment or 
a reinvestigation of the case about 10 percent of the time, and such 
·recommendations are accepted by the Chief of the District Public 
Prosecutor's Office in 30 percent of the cases. 50 'lnJapan in 1971 less 
Human Rights; David H. Bayley, Public Liberties in the New States (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Co., 1964). On judicial roles in civil law systems, see john Henry Merryman, The Civil 
Law Tradition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1g6g); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, 
'Common Law and Civil Law: A Historical Comparison,' Comparative Law, 2nd edition 
(Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1959), pp. 179-98. 
47 Article 4, Court Organization Law, Law No. 59 of April 16, 1947· See ltoh and 
Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, pp. 7-11, 251-5; Haley, 'Myth of the Reluctant 
Litigant,' pp. 381-g; and on the effect of an unconstitutional judgment, Ukai in Beer, 
Constitutionalism in Asia. 
48 Discussions with judges, Tokyo, 1978-1979. 
49 Haley, 'Myth of the Reluctant Litigant,' pp. 387-go. 
so Conversation with Matsuo Koya, specialist in criminal procedure law, 1979. 
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than 4 percent of persons convicted were given a jail sentence and almost 
two-thirds of those were suspended. Over g6 percent of persons 
convicted of a crime were punished only with a fine,' usually a small fine. 
Forty-four and seven-tenths percent of the convicted went to prison in 
the United States that year, and for much longer periods than the 
Japanese sentenced. Criminal justice in Japan is generally not severe. 
Freedom of expression is a sine qua non of any constitutional 
democracy. A review of the status offreedom of expression will thus be a 
particularly useful way of conveying reasonably reliable perspectives on 
the state ofJapan's democratic law. Issues to be touched on include the 
freedom to demonstrate, mass media freedom, privacy, obscenity, and 
textbook certification. 
The Law of Demonstrations 
In any assessment of the strength of freedom, we need to study judicial 
decisions, which are the backbone of the law on liberty, but especially 
where values differ from Western ones, we need to understand the 
society in order to comprehend how law is perceived and how it 
functions. For example, the Japanese commitment to groupism instead 
of to individualism has not, and does not, prevent people from resorting 
to the law to protect their rights and interests. 51 Nor has it been an 
obstacle to the people's support for the freedom of expression. 52 But it 
has affected the forms that these take. 
There is a strong sense of group right rather than individual right in 
public contexts, analogous to an individualist sense of right in the West. 
Largely due to this, privately and freely organized demonstrations have 
been very frequent in postwar Japan. Freedom of association and 
freedom of assembly have been central aspects of freedom of expression 
in Japan, and contrast sharply to the prewar suppression of these 
freedoms. Highly vocal but nonviolent group dissent or advocacy by 
groups seems more fully accepted public behavior in Japan than in the 
United States. 53 Even peaceful marches sometimes arouse considerable 
Bayley, Forces of Order, pp. 141-4. Civil liberties lawyer Ono Masao says police brutality 
is very rarely a problem; ibid., pp. 165-6. 
51 Haley, 'Myth of the Reluctant Litigant'; Kahei Rokumoto, 'Problems and 
Methodology of Study of Civil Disputes,' pt 1, Law in Japan: An Annuals ( 1972): 97-114, 
and pt 2, 6 (1973): 111-27. 
52 Beer in Claude (ed.), Comparative Human Rights, pp. 101-g. 
53 On the other hand, individual dissent and post-consensus dissent from the views of 
one's in-group seem notably limited in Japan. However, pre-consensus debate within 
18 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
public ire in the United States, as they did during the civil rights and 
anti-war movements of the I g6os and I 970s. 54 
A number of agencies and laws regulate demonstrations in japan, 55 
but the most important are the local 'public safety ordinances' (koan 
jorei) and 'public safety commissions' (koan iinkai) of prefectures or 
cities. 56 The key constitutional provision on freedom of expression is 
Article 2I: 
Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other 
forms of expression are guaranteed. 
2. No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of 
communication be violated. 
Basic Supreme Court doctrine on demonstrations and other 'collec-
tive activities' was laid down in the landmark Tokyo Ordinance 
Decision in Ig6o, 57 which held that local authorities are obliged under 
public safety ordinances to grant permits with 'maximum respect for 
freedom of expression.' Denial of a permit is legitimate only when a 
collective activity 'will directly endanger the maintenance of the public 
peace' and thus contravene 'the public welfare' (kokyo no fukushi). 
Later judicial decisions have followed and refined Tokyo doctrine. 58 
Although the 'public welfare' was defined early (I 950) by the Supreme 
Court as 'the maintenance of order and respect for the fundamental 
human rights of the individual,' 59 for many years the judicial use of the 
term has evoked unease and protest from many constitutional lawyers 
and opposition politicians. 'Public welfare' has reminded them of terms 
used during the ultra-nationalist period to urge all to forget their own 
interests and revere the Emperor. 60 
one's group is relatively uninhibited (except by the seniority order of presentation), as is 
expression of group disagreement with government policies or the opinions of' outsiders' 
of whatever kind. See Beer in ibid. 
54 See Bayley, Forces of Order, pp. I 72-83. 
55 Freedom of assembly can be regulated under Article 7 of Doro Kotsiiho (Law I05 of 
I96o), Article I9 of Densenbyo yoboho (Law 36 of I897), Articles 5 and 7, Hakai katsudO 
boshiho (Law 240 of I952), Articles 106 and I07, Keiho, and Article 4 of Ministry of 
Welfare Order No. I9 of I949 (Official Gazette, No. 938); and by public safety ordinances. 
56 On public safety ordinances and their use, see Beer in Claude (ed.), Comparative 
Human Rights. 
57 Japan v. Ito, I4 Keishu I243 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, July 20, I96o). For a 
translation and the ordinance in question, see Maki ( ed.), Court and Constitution in Japan, 
pp. 84-I I6. For an analysis, see Beer in Claude, Comparative Human Rights, pp. I I5-I8. 
58 The Supreme Court can and does on occasion reverse its own precedent. For 
examples, see Cases 7 and 24 in ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan. 
59 Japan v. Sugino, 4 Keishu 20I2, IOI4 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, I950). 
60 See Miyazawa Toshiyoshi, Nihonkoku kenpo (Nihon Hyoronsha, I963), p. 205; and 
Yamamoto Keiichi, 'Kokyo no fukushi,' in Tanakajiro ( ed.), Nihonkoku kenpo taikei, Vol. 
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One of the most significant developments in constitutional law since 
I 94 7 may be the decreased use, especially in the lower courts, of abstract 
formulations of public welfare doctrine, and increased specificity since 
I965. 61 The courts have honed more concrete criteria for determining 
what the public welfare is in each class of cases. These technical 
developments are in some cases due more to changes in judicial 
education, the influence of legal scholars, and accumulated judicial 
experience under the I947 constitution than to liberalism. For example, 
Tokyo doctrine, which was handed down in the aftermath of the I 960 
Security Treaty Crisis, deemphasized the place where demonstrations 
are held. In fact, Tokyo upholds the right of authorities to regulate mass 
demonstrations 'in any place whatsoever,' contending that debate on 
such matters as place is 'completely profitless.' But a 1970 Supreme 
Court decision hinged upon the meaning of 'public place' (kokyo no 
basho) in the Hiroshima prefectural ordinance. It was defined by the 
judges as 'a place which in reality is generally open and can be used and 
entered freely by unspecified persons.'62 The ordinance requires a 
permit only for a demonstration which is to take place in a public place. 
The accused were public employees who staged a demonstration outside 
the prefectural capitol building without obtaining a permit. They 
contended the ordinance did not apply, since the location of the 
demonstration was not a public place; the judges disagreed, and they 
lost their case. 
Vigorous exercise of the freedom to demonstrate by groups represent-
ing local and national interests will likely continue little affected by 
adverse court decisions. Most public group actions injapan are orderly 
and peaceful, and are often attended with colorful pageantry and a 
festival spirit, a healthy blend of seriousness and play. Convictions for 
illegal collective activities are usually for physical obstruction or 
violence which would be held illegal in most or all of the world's other 
democratic courts; and as noted earlier,Japan's courts are quite lenient 
in sentencing. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been criticized 
when it has overturned acquittals handed down by both a trial court 
8 (Yiihikaku, I96I}, p. I6. On legal theories in Japan on the public welfare, see Sato 
Isao, Kenpo Kenlcu Nyumon, 3 vols (Nihon Hyoronsha, I966) 2: 25-I I 7· 
61 Ashibe Nobuyoshi et al., 'Kenpo hanrei no 30nen,' ]urisuto, special issue (:\fay 3, 
I977): 452, 453, and in the same issue commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of 
Japan's constitution, see Ito Masami, 'Kenpo kaishaku to rieki koryoron,' p. 200, on the 
increased judicial use of an interests-balancing approach. See in general this issue of 
]urisuto and Kenposanjunen no riron to tenbo, l!Oritsu]iho, rinji zokan (May, I977), onJapan's 
constitutionalism. 
62 See Asahi Shinbun, July I7, I970 (Sup. Ct., Petty Bench, July I6, I97o); 
conversations with Justice Irie Toshio, January, I97 I. 
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and an appellate court; this it did about twenty times between I 974 and 
I 979 in civil liberties cases. The ever-clearer restriction in the political 
activities of public employees to voting alone deserves special mention. 
In the late 1 96os, the Supreme Court recognized that different degrees of 
restraint are appropriate to a management-level official in a Ministry 
and a janitor in the public monopoly tobacco corporation.63 But 
between 1973 and 1978, decisions of the Supreme Court affected 
adversely the political freedom of public employees. 
In the famous Sarufutsu Case,64 for example, a postal employee was 
convicted for putting up six political posters on a public bulletin board 
during his leisure hours. The issues still debated include the proper 
delineation of limits on the rights of teachers, postal workers, telecom-
munications workers, and transportation workers to strike or to engage 
in political activities, and whether administrative discipline (most 
common), criminal penalties or no punishment should be applied for 
related violations of the laws governing public employees. 
Some Aspects of Freedom for the Mass Media 
Along with group activism, freedom of the press is particularly close to 
the core ofjapanese democracy, because the mass media may represent 
the only power centers that are effectively organized, separate from the 
government, linked with important people and groups, especially in 
Tokyo and Osaka, and whose influences spread throughout the nation. 
Japan's print and broadcast media are mammoth in scale, technolo-
gically impressive, and socially pervasive. 65 Daily newspapers with 
nationwide circulation like the Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun, Yomiuri 
Shinbun, and Nihon Keizai Shinbun print over fifty million copies each day, 
about twenty percent of which are distributed in Tokyo. The news-
papers' political roles are complex, although the major papers do not 
63 See, for example, Japan v. Sakane et al., supra n. I5, and Toyama et al. v. Japan, 20 
Keishii (No. 8) goi (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October 26, Ig66), in Itoh and Beer, 
Constitutional Case Law of Japan, pp. 85-I30. See also RodiJ to jinken (Hogaku 
seminah-Nihon Hyoronsha, I978). 
64 Japan v. Ozawa, 28 Keishu (No. g) 393 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, November6, I974). 
For comment, see Ukai in Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia, pp. I22-5; and 'Recent 
Developments-Constitutional Law,' Law in Japan: An Annual8 (I975): 205-8. 
65 On the courts and media, see Lawrence W. Beer, 'Freedom oflnformation and the 
Evidentiary Use of Film in japan .... ,' The American Political Science Review 65 (I97I): 
I I 1g-34; Genron to masu komi (Hogaku seminah-Nihon Hyoronsha, I978); Gendai no masu 
komi, Jurisuto, sogotokushu No.5 (October I976); Masami Ito et al., Broadcasting in Japan 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Horibe Masao, Akusesuken Iowa nanika 
(Iwanami Shinsho, 1978). 
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endorse political candidates. For example, the press helped to sustain 
the crisis atmosphere for a time during the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, 
they moderated the tension in most cases during the nationwide 
University Crisis of 1g68-6g, they massively publicized the Lockheed 
scandals and trials during the 1970s after disclosures were made in the 
United States, and they have played a major role in activating, 
publicizing and supporting the consensus against pollution since 1970. 
The principal organization for newspapers, television and radio is the 
Nihon Shinbun Kyokai Qapan Newspaper Editors and Publishers Associ-
ation), which at times when a need is felt can form a cohesive power 
center by alliance among its leaders in the face of external threat. For 
example, during the Hakata Station Film Controversy of 1969, the 
media united to oppose a court order for evidence to be presented (TV 
film of a student-police confrontation) in the alleged absence of other or 
better evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the courts' prerogatives 
after months of well-organized media reistance. 
The University of Missouri world survey of press freedom rates japan 
highly, but has noted industry centralization and self-regulation as 
problems. On the latter score, the 'kisha kurabu' (press clubs) attached to 
politicians or agencies may be mentioned. Reporters from competing 
papers do not so much compete for news, as they form a coherent group 
which may determine when what news is suitable for release to their 
respective papers. Stable ties can develop between a 'reliable source' 
and a press club; the wishes of both the club and the source may heavily 
influence what a reporter decides to convey to the public. (Foreign 
correspondents are not welcome.) There is some merit in the system, 
because secrecy-loving officials would probably obstruct access to 
information more substantially, if the cordial relations of mutual trust 
with the press did not exist. On the other hand, this system of 
agency-media and reporter-reporter relations too effectively limits the 
freedom ofinformation, and is one reason why news of such affairs as the 
Lockheed scandals derived first from foreign sources rather than from 
Japanese investigative journalism. The right of access to information 
(akusesuken) and the individual's right to know have been major themes 
studied by specialists such as Ito Masami, Shimizu Hideo, Okudaira 
Yasuhiro, and Horibe Masao. 
In the Nishiyama Decision of 1978,66 the Supreme Court made its first 
ruling on the relationships between state secrets and newsgathering. 
66 Nishiyama v. Japan, Hanrei Jiho 887 (July r r, 1978): 14-41 (Sup. Ct., First Petty 
Bench, May 31, 1978); Ronald G. Brown, 'Government Secrecy and the "People's 
Right to Know" in Japan: Implications of the Nishiyama Case,' Law in Japan: An Annual 
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While attached to the Foreign Ministry, Nishiyama Takichi, a reporter 
for the Mainichi Shinbun, gained access to secret cables on the negotiation 
of terms for the reversion ofOkinawa to japan. Nishiyama had received 
this information from Hasumi Kikuko, a girl friend working in the 
Ministry. At a Diet committee meeting on March 27, I972, a Socialist 
OSP) member made the contents of the cables, received somehow from 
Nishiyama, a part of his attack on government policies. The documents 
contradicted the government's earlier assurances that no secret agree-
ments had been made with the U.S. The Supreme Court held: (I) that 
the courts have the authority to determine what constitutes a state secret 
under the National Public Employees Law (and what, for example, is 
merely a political secret); (2) that the government's secrecy regarding 
international negotiations in this case was appropriate; (3) that the 
government's failure to bring the full facts before the Diet did not 
conflict with the constitutional order or constitute illegal secrecy; and 
(4) that although free newsgathering and reporting are of special 
importance to the people's democratic right to know and freedom of 
expression generally, Nishiyama violated the legal prohibition against 
inducing divulgence of official secrets by a public employee in his 
ethically questionable relationship with Hasumi, a married woman. 
The right of privacy has been another noteworthy issue in recent law. 
Expanded press freedom since I 945 has occasioned an increase in 
journalistic excursions into the private lives of political leaders, other 
public figures, and ordinary citizens (unknown but for a cruel expose). 67 
The former have served the people's right to know about and criticize 
the famous and the powerful. According to a survey, both well-known 
and unknown victims of defamation and violation of privacy more often 
suffer in silence and 'go to bed weeping' (nakineiri suru) than assert their 
legal rights as individuals. The consensus among scholars seems to be 
that there have been too few legal charges lodged by victims. Where any 
redress has been sought, the more common solution has been a 
conciliatory out-of-court settlement with public and private apologies 
and monetary compensation by publishers. 
IO ( I977)i I I2-39· See also the final report of the Secrecy and Disclosure Subcommittee, 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, October, I978, U.S. Senate. 
67 Lawrence W. Beer, 'Defamation, Privacy and Freedom of Expression in Japan,' 
Law in Japan: An Annual 5 (I 972): I 92-208; Ito Masami, Puraibashii no kenri (I wan ami 
Shoten, I963); Shimizu Hideo, HO to masu komyii.nikeshon (Shakai Shisosha, I97o); and 
Meiyo-puraibashii no shintenkai, Jurisuto 653 (December I, I 977). On rights of the person in 
the United States, see Don R. Pember, Privacy and the Press (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, I972); and Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, I97I). 
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Courts and scholars alike have strongly supported the rights to 
privacy (puraibashii) and good name, but there seems to have been a low 
demand for the legal protection of these rights at least until the I970S. In 
sharp contrast to official secrecy, the right of privacy seems to have been 
less honored in group-oriented Japan than the right of families, 
occupational groups or other groups or communities to know about the 
affairs of their members, and to impose sanctions for deviance. For 
example, the institution of ostracism from the community (mura hachibu) 
for non-conformity is a persistent problem, according to Japan's Civil 
Liberties Bureau. 68 On the other hand, if one values the positive aspects 
of the strong Japanese sense of community, one must hope that a stress 
on privacy rights will not unduly disturb it. 
The constitutional right of privacy was first established inJapan not 
by a law, but by a I964 Tokyo district court decision against Mishima 
Yukio in a case involving his novel Utage no A to (After the Banquet). 69 The 
novel, serialized in Chuo lloron in I g6 I, dealt in thinly veiled fashion with 
marital affairs of Arita Hachiro, a Socialist OSP) politician and 
unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate in the I g6o Tokyo elections. Arita 
sued Mishima, who was ordered to pay a substantial amount in 
damages. The emergence of the right of privacy is an example of the 
considerable influence of Japanese legal scholars on some areas of the 
law, the fruitful interaction of campus and court, and the importation of 
a legal concept from American law into Japanese legal discourse. 
I>H Conversation with Onizuka Kentaro, Head, Civil Liberties Bureau, Justice 
Ministry, October, 1978. See Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan,' p. 13. 
Mura hachibu, ostracism from the village, was the prototype of this powerful sanction, but 
for the Tokugawa period, machi hachibu (ostracism from commercial districts of towns 
and cities) was also common. See Nihon Kei<.ai ]iten (Nihon hyoronsha, 1943), p. 1844-
Today mura hachibu is the official catch-all term for illegal ostracism. In the cities, mura 
hachibu may even include ostracism of a housewife in a modern apartment complex by 
other women living there. 
69 Arita v. Mishima, 15 Kakyu Minshu (No. g) 2317 (Tokyo district court, September 
28, 1964). For Donald Keen's translation of the novel at issue, see Yukio Mishima, After 
the Banquet (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). On private enforcement of rights, see 
Hideo Tanaka and Akio Takeuchi, 'The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of 
Law: A Comparative Study of japanese and American Law,' Law in Japan: An Annual7 
(1974): 34-50. The Civil Code provisions are: 
'Article 709. A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is 
bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom. 
'Article 710. A person who is liable in compensation for damages in accordance with 
the provisions of the preceding Article shall make compensation therefor even in respect 
of a nonpecuniary damage, irrespective of whether such injury was to the person, liberty 
or reputation of another or to his property rights.' 
A theory which would directly apply such constitutional guarantees as good name 
and privacy without reference to code provisions seems to have little support. See lJkai 
in Beer, Constitutionalism in Asia, p. 1 22; and Ashibe, Kenpo, pp. 39-97· 
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The constitutional basis for the privacy right is found in the sentence, 
'All of the people shall be respected as individuals' in Article I 3, while 
code law provision is detected in Articles 709 and 7IO ofthe Civil Code, 
under which a person is bound to make compensation for intentional or 
negligent violation of the right of another, whether 'injury was to the 
person, liberty, or rep~tation of another or to his property rights.' 
Among other noteworthy privacy cases are the following: 
(I) A I 969 Supreme Court decision held that, as an aspect of the 
right of privacy, one has the right not to be photographed against one's 
will during an illegal demonstration unless the photography was 
necessary to a criminal investigation. 70 
(2) A I969 Tokyo high court decision in the Kato Case required a 
weekly magazine to pay remuneration and to apologize publicly in a 
national newspaper, on grounds of damage to good name and privacy 
rights. 71 The magazine at issue claimed that two famous TV and film 
personalities cohabited before marriage, which was denied. 
(3) In I 970, an injunction to ban the showing of an art film on the 
grounds of privacy violation was denied. 72 The film dealt with the early 
amorous and political affairs of an elderly feminist politician, Kami-
chika Ichiko; but she herself had publicized her private life on a number 
of prior occasions, thus negating in the court's view the confidentiality 
factor necessary for a valid claim of privacy violation. 
(4) The I977 Kawabata Case was settled out of court with public 
apologies for lack of circumspection. The bereaved family of the late 
Nobel Prize-winning novelist, Kawabata Yasunari, sued the publisher 
and author of a novel which suggested that Kawabata's I972 suicide 
was linked to indiscreet relations with the family maid, apparently an 
outcast burakumin. 73 
Incidentally, the increase in civil defamation suits in the early I 970s 
70 Hasegawa v. Japan, 23 Keishu 1625 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, December 24, 1969). 
For a translation, see ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law rif Japan, pp. 178-82. Similar 
specification of the public welfare as what is necessary for criminal justice is used by the 
same court in Kaneko v. Japan, 23 Keishu 1490 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, November 26, 
1969), translated in ibid., pp. 246-50. 
71 Kato v. Shiikan ]itsuwa, Hanrei Jiho 537 ( 1968) 28 (Tokyo district court, November 
25, 1968), and Shiikan Jitsuwa v. Kato, ]urisuto 449 (1970): 128 (Tokyo high court, 
December 25, 1969). 
72 
'Eros+Gyakusatsu' Case, Kamichika v. Art Theatre Guild, Jurisuto 449 (1970): 21 
(Tokyo district court, March 14, 1970), and 23 1\ominshu (No.2) 172 (Tokyo high court, 
April 13, 1970). See also, Asahi Shinbun, April 13 and 14 (morning and evening edns). 
73 Kawabata v. Chikuma Shobo et al., Tokyo district court, 1977. See Japan Times Weekry 
Edition, August 27, 1977. Burakumin are still discriminated against socially, despite laws 
to the contrary, as noted in the concluding section of this paper. 
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exemplifies the utility of analyzing the side effects of specific legal 
changes. 74 An important but unintended and unforeseen byproduct of 
legal change in one issue area affected the effects and applications oflaw 
in another. Prior to I970, very few civil defamation suits had been 
brought to court compared, for example, to German and French 
experience under similar defamation laws. 75 In the early I970s, the 
success of groups and individuals bringing civil suits against companies 
for injury or illness caused by pollution was thoroughly publicized. As a 
result, popular awareness of the possibility of effective court action 
against newspapers and other media enterprises for civil defamation rose 
dramatically, and so did the number of successful suits. 76 • 
The obscenity question is another media-related issue affected by the 
second modern constitutional revolution. Under Article I 75 of the 
Criminal Code, various laws regulating the media, the police laws, 
obscenity regulation, public security maintenance and thought control 
were sometimes linked in the Japanese official mind before I945. 77 
Today, such connections are seen by few officials and citizens. Since the 
Occupation period, Japan has been again rather tolerant, producing 
large numbers of erotic books, pictures, magazines, comic books, 
advertisements, TV broadcasts, motion pictures and tape recordings. 78 
There have been two major Supreme Court decisions on obscenity, 
both concerning translations of foreign works: the I 95 7 Lady Chatterley's 
Lover Case 79 and the I 969 de Sade Case. 80 Article I 75 provides penalties 
74 See the statistics for both civil and criminal defamation in annual reports in l!Oso 
Jiho ( l!Osokai). 
75 For example, at least until the I 970s, on a per capita basis France and Germany had 
roughly 200 times as many defamation suits and ten times more convictions thanjapan. 
See K. Igarashi and H. Tamiya, Meiyo to puraibashii ( I968), pp. 74-78; Jurisuto 332 
(I965): 6o; and Jurisuto 653 (I970). 
76 Conversations with judge Muto Shunko, Legal Training and Research Institute, 
in july, I973 and December, I978. The sharp rise in civil defamation suits peaked in 
I973 and thereafter leveled off. 
77 The term'waisetsu' (obscenity) and punishment of its 'public display or sale' first 
appeared in Article 259 of the Criminal Code of I88o. Article I75 of the I907 revised 
Criminal Code remains today the primary legal provision for restraint of obscenity, 
amended only in I 94 7 by the addition of imprisonment to fines as possible penalties. See 
Shimizu, l1o to masu komyunikeshon, and Okudaira Y asuhiro, Hyogen no jiyu towa nanika 
(Chiiokoronsha, I970). 
78 Shimizu, l1o to masu komyunikeshon, pp. I 7o-89, presents historical perspective on 
Japan's obscenity law. 
79 Ito et at. v. Japan, I I Keishu (No.3) 997 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, March I 3, I957); a 
translation is in Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan, pp. 3-37. 
80 Ishii et at. v. Japan, 23 Keishu (No. 10) I 239 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October I 5, 
I969); all opinions are translated in ltoh and Beer, Constitutional Case LAw of Japan, pp. 
I83-2 I 7· 
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for 'a person who distributes or sells an obscene writing, picture or other 
object or who publicly displays the same ... '. 81 In Chatterley the 
Supreme Court held that twelve obscene passages at issue infected D.H. 
Lawrence's entire work with obscenity, and defined obscenity as 
follows: 82 'In order for a writing to be obscene, it is required that it 
wantonly arouse and stimulate sexual desire, offend the normal sense of 
shame, and run counter to proper concepts of sexual morality.' 
The Chatterley decision has continued to draw criticism from liberal 
scholars for arrogating to the courts 'a clinical role' in the event society's 
moral views become lax. In de Sade, the court generally followed 
Chatterley doctrine, but seemed to some analysts to stress artistry and 
intellectual values more than Chatterley in the following passage: 83 
There may be cases where the artistry and intellectual content of a work may 
diminish and moderate the sexual stimulus caused by its portrayal of sex to a 
degree less than that which is the object of punishment in the Criminal Code, so 
as to negate obscenity .... 
Dissenting opinions denied the obscenity of the partial translation of de 
Sade's In Praise of Vice either because of its artistic and intellectual 
content, or because its sadistic repulsiveness reduced its erotic appeal to 
insignificance. Majority doctrine is regarded by commentators as 
somewhat restrictive. 84 
While providing binding guidelines for official Japan, judicial 
decisions do not give much hint of the systems for purveying and 
regulating obscenity in Japan. Critical to freedom of erotica are public 
agencies and private regulatory agencies connected with different 
industries. For example, the major motion picture producer-distributors 
abide by decisions of their own Motion Picture Ethics Committee (Eiga 
Rinrikitei Kanri Iinkai, or Eirin) in applying the industry's code of ethics 
and their understanding of what is legally permissible.85 The film Kuroi 
Yuki (Black Snow) was shown with the approval of Eirin, but was held 
~ 1 Ministry of justice, japan, Criminal Statutes (n.d.), Vol. I, p. 39· 
82 See Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan, p. 7· 
83 Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case Law of Japan, p. 184. See also Chin Kim, 
'Constitution and Obscenity: japan and the U.S.A.,' American Journal of Comparative Law 
23 ( 1975): 255· 
84 lto Masami and Shimizu Hideo (eds), Masu komi horeiyoran (Gendaijii.narizumu 
Shuppankai, I 966); Shimizu, 110 to masu komy'imikeshon; Okudaira, Hyogen no jiyU Iowa 
nanika. 
85 Discussions with Ito Masami, a member of Eirin, August", I979· Concerning Eirin, 
see Masu Komi Rinri Kondankai (ed.), Masu komi no shakai sekinin (Nihon Shinbun 
K yokai, I g66), hereafter cited as Sekinin. Onj a pan's film industry see also J. I. Anderson 
and D. Richie, The Japanese Film: Art and Industry (New York: Grove Press, Ig6o). 
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obscene by the Tokyo high court in I969. 86 For some years after that, 
the courts did not accept Eirin's view as a basis for immunity from 
prosecution. Black Snow depicted the life of prostitutes in the environs of 
an American base. The accused were acquitted on grounds that until 
this judicial decision, they could assume reasonably that if Eirin 
approved of a work, it was indeed legal. On the other hand, the Tokyo 
district court held in the I 978 Nikkatsu Romantic Sex Film Case87 that 
Eirin was an instrument for determining what is in accord with 
prevailing community standards, and acquitted the Nikkatsu company 
of obscenity charges based on Eirin approval of its films. However, scores 
of 'eroductions' appear annually, unregulated by Eirin and rarely 
restricted by officials. 
The Customs Bureau censors imported films and pictures, 88 particu-
larly those brought in for commercial purposes, with the assistance of a 
committee of citizens of'learning and experience.' 89 The constitutiona-
lity of this system is questioned by scholars, and some judges. In the first 
test case reaching the appellate level-one involving a challenge to a 
denial of permission to import nude picture books-the Supreme Court 
in I 979 ordered a retrial favoring the challenge, but did not clearly 
present its own doctrine. 90 
Frank and undisguised pornographic writings with the traditional 
designation of shunpon (literally, springtime books), can be found in 
specialized shops and do not often generate widespread concern. Weekly 
pulp magazines, poster advertisements, pornography vending 
machines, and lewd comic books for children present the most 
noteworthy problems today. Their content is often strongly erotic and 
presents a degraded image ofhumanity, especially women. 
About sixty percent of japan's popular magazine sales take place in 
newsstands in railway stations, where concession privileges are con-
86 Japan v. Murakami et al., Hanrei JihO 57 I (November II, I969): I9 (Tokyo high 
court, September I7, I969). 
87 Japan v . .Nikkatsu Co., Hanrei JihO 897 (October II, I978): 39-53 (Tokyo district 
court, June 23, I978); Asahi Shinbun,June 23 (evening edn), 24, I978. 'Black Snow' was 
also a Nikkatsu film. In the I970s Nikkatsu turned out a series of sexually explicit films 
allegedly to help clear up debts due to legal fees in an earlier case, and due to the 
depression of Japan's film industry. Japan Times, November 4, I977; Asahi Shinbun, 
January 28 (eveningedn), (eveningedn), February II, May 25, and June 2I, I972; and 
Fujiki Hideo, 'Eirinjiken 0 meguru horitsu mondai,' ]urisuto 504 (May I, I972): s6. For 
'Poruno sangyo toshite no Nihon eiga,' see Asahi ]anaru (April 28, I972): 38; also 
]urisuto, special issue (December Io, I97o). 
88 This was done under the Customs Standards Law (Kanzei teiritsu ho), Law 54 of 
April II, I9II, Article II, which is in Ito and Shimizu, Masu komi horeiyoran, p. 75· 
89 For examples of seizures at airports, see Asahi Shinbun, January I7, I979· 
90 Hanrei Jiho 707 (I973): I6 (Tokyo high court, April 26, I973)· 
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trolled by the private Railroad Benefit Association (Tetsuao llosaikai). 91 
The RBA can forbid the sale of a magazine or a particular issue of a 
magazine which its officials feel might be obscene. Among other 
sanctions, should police seize a magazine under obscenity law, the RBA 
may ban the next three issues from all its newsstands. 
Local systems for regulating reading material outside train stations 
vary. For example, the private but powerful Tokyo Newspaper Sellers 
Commission ( Tokyoto Shinbun Sokubai Iinkai) 92 determines the permissi-
bility of distributing certain magazines to member newsstands and 
bookstores, and makes periodic spot checks to assure compliance with its 
policies. If objectionable material is found, a review committee considers 
the case and rna y issue a warning. Three warnings in a single year or one 
police seizure of a magazine may bring suspension of the seller's 
franchise. In addition, the Publications Ethics Council (Shuppan Rinri 
Kyogikai) has been the publishing industry's main self-regulatory agency 
since I 963; but it does not appear very vigorous and it is helpless vis-a-vis 
'outsiders', who do not belong to the Magazine Publishers Association 
(,Zasshi Kyokai) or other industry organizations. 93 
The above and other private-sector systems of restraint combine in a 
complex web; they are supplemented by 39 local youth protection 
ordinances.94 Ordinances such as Tokyo's encourage primary reliance 
upon self-regulatory systems. The Tokyo Governor may give warnings 
which, if not heeded, are followed by an order to stamp 'unfit for youth' 
on the cover of offending publications. In some cases, a dozen or more 
official cautions or warnings have been given before any other 
enforcement action was taken against pornography affecting children. 95 
In 1979, parental and official concern focused on pornography vending 
machines within easy access of young children, and on objectionable TV 
advertisements and films shown during children's usual viewing 
91 Sekinin, pp. 5 I-75·. (This book, available only at the offices of the Nihon Shin bun 
Kyokai, remains a principal source of information on private regulatory systems.) In 
addition to the criminal and customs law provisions already mentioned, obscenity is also 
regulated under llogyo ho (Law 137 of July 10, 1948), Fuzoku eigyo torishimari ho, Kankyo 
eisei ho, Denpa ho, HOso ho, and local youth protection ordinances. 
92 Sekinin, pp. 273, 64. 93 Asahi Shinbun, January 22, 1979, an interview with Nunokawa Kakuzaemon, 
President, Publication Ethics Council, and member, Tokyo Youth Protection Council. 
94 Sekinin, p. 208; and Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 12, 1978. 
95 Nihon Keizai Shinbun,July 12, 1978. For example, amidst widespread parental and 
public concern, pornography vending machines in Saitama Prefecture increased from 
887 in August, 1977 to 2,1 16onJuly 31, 1978. Mter a great many warnings, police seized 
two machines in October, 1978. Asahi Shinbun, October 10, 1978. 
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hours. 96 Efforts to solve the latter problem have been led by local TV 
branches of the Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Labor Unions 
(Minpo Roren).97 
As in other areas of regulation, so in restraining obscenity, particu-
larly on behalf of children, Japanese regulatory authority is spread 
around among many public and private agencies, while the courts and 
interested scholars debate rather abstract definitions. The picture that 
emerges is not one of clear or simple leniency or restrictiveness, but 
relations between law and society resembling in complexity a kanji 
ideograph of 25 strokes. As William Spinrad notes in his sociology of civil 
liberties, formalized and just legal structures are essential to freedom, 
but are 'never a carbon-copy reflection of the libertarian or anti-liber-
tarian attitudes of politicians or any general public consensus. ' 98 This 
applies toJapan. 99 
Government certification of pre-collegiate textbooks has been 
another object of controversy for many years, in part in reaction to the 
very stringent controls of prewar days. In the complicated processes of 
writing, publishing, local selection, and marketing of such textbooks 
may be found unintended restrictions on freedom which may be more· 
important than censorship, 100 and these problems are further compli-
cated by the polarization of debate on some educational issues along 
rigid political lines. The textbook certification process takes place within 
the Ministry of Education. The Ienaga Textbook Review Cases signifi-
cantly challenged administrative review criteria and processes with 
respect to textbooks, but also dramatized the continuing sensitivity of 
many Japanese to anything even faintly reminiscent of the thought 
control exercised by the prewar government. Professor Ienaga Saburo 
brought two suits, in rg65 and in rg67, against the Ministry of 
Education for requiring him to make changes in the manuscript of his 
revised high school history text under the Ministry's textbook certifica-
tion system. Both cases101 were on appeal in rg8o, one to the Supreme 
9° For example, occasionally imported Western films restricted to adult-oriented 
theatres in the United States are shown on commercial television inj a pan. See also Asahi 
Shinbun, September 22, 23, and December 12 (evening edn), 1978. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Spinrad, Civil Liberties, pp. 5-26, 292-306. On the law and experience of the L' nited 
States, see The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1970), especially pp. 346--442. 
99 For related opinion poll data, see Asahi Shinbum,January 3, 1979, p. 7· 
100 See Lawrence W. Beer, 'Education, Politics and Freedom of Expression in japan: 
The Ienaga Textbook Review Cases,' Law in Japan: An AnnualS (1975): 67-go. 
101 lenaga v. MinistryofEducation,Hanrei]iho 604 ( 1 970): 35 (Tokyo district court,July 
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Court against a 1975 high court ruling102 that the Ministry had failed to 
adhere to its own criteria in assessing Ienaga's book. 
Among the issues raised by the Ienaga cases are freedom of expression, 
academic freedom, the educational rights of parents, children and the 
state, and the question of whether the controversies themselves are 
among the great constitutional cases ofmodernJ a pan (a view this writer 
shares) or exclusively matters of administrative and civil law. A key 
point of contention was whether Ienaga's book was unfairly critical of 
the imperial family in discussing the mythological and historical origins 
of the Emperor system, so as to imply, to some, authoritarian unconcern 
for the people. The relevant passages are of less interest to Japanese 
school children than tonight's TV programs; but the length of the 
Ienaga controversy and the intensity of feeling supporting Ienaga well 
illustrate the concern ofjapanese intellectual elites, if not necessarily the 
generality of citizens, about possible reversion to reverence for the 
Emperor and an overturning of the postwar constitutional revolution. 
The treatment accorded pre-1945 history, domestic and international, 
in many school textbooks does gloss over a great many unpleasant facts, 
and Ienaga is not alone in complaining about this tendency. 103 lenaga's 
special concern is understandable, as he was a principal co-author of the 
first official history text for the compulsory grades in postwar Japan. 104 
Moreover, official systems for restricting freedom of thought and 
expression in prewar Japan were realistically seen as coercive measures 
secondary to and supplementary to the desired natural effects of a 
modern public education system permeated with the imperial ortho-
doxy over a period of decades. 
Conclusion: Some Problems and Prospects 
Japan is now in a constitutional era when concern about reversion to the 
prewar system may recede into the background for the salaried man and 
17, 1970); and lenaga v. Ministry of Education, Hanrei]iho, special issue (October 15, 1974) 
and Jurisuto 569 (1974): 14 (Tokyo district court, july 16, 1974). 
102 Ministry of Education v. lenaga, Hanrei Jiho Boo (1976): 19 (Tokyo high court, 
December 20, 1975). 
103 Private discussions with Japanese textbook authors at various times during the 
1970S. 
104 Ministry of Education (ed.), Kuni no ayumi (October, 1946). For a recent 
expression of Ienaga's views, see Rekishi no naka no kenpo (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 
1977), 2 vols. Ienagasees the issues in broad constitutional and political terms, as part of 
efforts on behalf of Article 9 and against constitutional revision. Correspondence with 
the author, December 10, 1978. 
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his family. 105 Among noteworthy constitutional issues now pending 
are: the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces; limits on the 
freedom of expression of public employees; delayed justice in the courts; 
unreviewed internal rules and processes of regulatory agencies which 
affect individual rights; the extent of expanding environmental rights; 
discrimination against burakumin (traditional outcasts), women, 
Okinawans, and resident aliens; and serious malapportionment of seats 
in the Diet. 
In substance, the Supreme Court will most likely concur with the 
Sapporo high court in upholding the constitutionality of the Self-
Defense Forces in the Naganuma Case. 106 The debate on this case in the 
past decade has helped to refine and clarify positions on this unique 
issue. Article g's pacifist provisions may well continue to be meaningful 
in law and politics as a unique symbol of self-restraint on military power 
and the constitutional order under the 'Peace Constitution,' and needs 
to be understood by Japan's allies. Whether a similar confluence of 
history, internal law and politics, and geopolitics will enable pacifism to 
occur in another nation-state remains to be seen. 
Discrimination is a significant constitutional and human problem in 
Japan, although it does not receive much attention from scholars and is 
of interest to relatively few lawyers, politicians and citizens as yet. The 
Civil Liberties Bureau works imaginatively to combat discrimination 
through educational means and the Civil Liberties Commissioner 
system. 107 Social discrimination against the million Okinawans is likely 
to continue. The burakumin, numbering something over 1 ·5 million by 
government estimates and 3 million according to the Burakumin 
Liberation Movement, have been helped, as Japanese citizens, by 
remedial discrimination in the 1970s which has provided them with 
educational and other aid. 108 However, resident aliens, legal and 
illegal, have little recourse under Japanese law, and are not eligible 
for aid from the Civil Liberties Commissioners. 109 Most notable are 
roughly 65o,ooo Koreans, so,ooo Chinese, and the 2,500 unwelcome 
105 See Asahi Shinbun, January 1, 1979, pp. 1, g-13. Survey results therein indicate 
middle-class preoccupation, not with large political questions, especially those of the 
past, but with work, inflation, children's education, and other immediate problems. 
106 See sources cited supra, n. 30. 
107 Beer and Weeramantry, 'Human Rights in japan'. 
108 Tokei Nenkan (Okurasho Insatsukyoku, 1977), p. 26. 
109 Discussions with Onizuka Kentaro (Head, Civil Liberties Bureau), Nakadaira 
Kenkichi (attorney), Sasahara Keisuke (attorney}, and Ando lsamu (Head, Asian 
Relations Center, Sophia University, Tokyo}, in 1978 and 1979. 
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refugees from Indochina in and out ofjapan since mid-1975. 11° For the 
above and for women, employment discrimination is the most discussed 
problem. Many burakumin and aliens also suffer private restraints on 
their choice of a marriage partner. 111 
Revised rules of the LDP for the selection of the party president (and, 
as a consequence, the Prime Minister) which were used for the first time 
in late 1978 have established something comparable to a primary 
election system, though not preliminary, as in the United States, to a 
popular election for public office, but to a run-off election for party 
leadership. This may be viewed as a quasi-constitutional innovation, as 
previously the electors were limited to the parliamentary party, plus 
prefectural party leaders. Votes were cast by registered LDP members 
throughout the country in November, 1978, and Ohira Masayoshi 
received perhaps the highest total (more than 55o,ooo votes) ever 
received in an election by a single aspirant to the premiership. 112 Ohira 
became party president, when the second-ranking vote-getter (offour 
candidates), Fukuda Takeo, declined to participate in a run-off election. 
The new system encourages broader popular participation in LDP 
politics. 
110 Japan came under some international pressure in I978 and I979 to allow some 
refugees to reside in Japan. However, as of July I979, only I2 Southeast Asian refugees 
had been given visas for a year or so of residence. Of wider interest in Japan with respect 
to rights of foreigners in Japan was the McLean Case, McLean v. Japan, Hanrei Jiho 903 
(December I, I978): 3-20 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, October 4, I978). The Supreme 
Court denied McLean, a teacher active in peaceful and legal activities opposing the 
American involvement in Vietnam in I969-I970, the renewal of his visa, saying that 
while foreign residents in Japan have the same freedom of expression under the 
Constitution as Japanese citizens, the Justice Ministry has discretionary authority to 
take into account whatever factors it thinks appropriate, including legal political 
activities, when determining whether or not to renew a visa. See Katsuhiko Okazaki, 
'Foreign Nationals in Japan and the Human Rights Question,' The Japan Timu, 
December I7, I978; Kokusaikajidai no horitsu mondai, Jurisuto 68I Qanuary I, I979), 
·especially pp. I3-26, 66-76. 
111 Sources cited supra, n. 109; Asahi Shinbun, January 2I, I979;Joyce C. Lebra et al. 
(eds), Women in Changing Japan (Boulder: Westview Press, I976); seen. I I4, irifra. 
112 The LDP rules provide that one electoral point is assigned to a prefectural party 
chapter for every I ,ooo party members. The two national party candidates with the 
most votes in each prefecture divide the points in proportion to the number of votes each 
receives in the 'primary'. No other candidates are allotted electoral points. The voting 
for the four candidates in the I978 primary election was as follows: Ohira Masayoshi 
550,89I (748 points); Fukuda Takeo, 472,503 (638); Nakasone Yasuhiro, I97,957 (93); 
Komoto Toshio, 88,9I7 (46). Asahi Shinbun, morning and evening edns, November 27, 
28, and December 8, I 978. After the first round in a primary with more than two 
candidates in which no one has received a majority of the points, the top two vote-getters 
compete in a run-off election. In I978, Fukuda withdrew his candidacy before the 
run-off. See also Minoru Shimizu, 'LDP Reform Movement Retrogresses,' The Japan 
Times, May 24, I979· 
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However, the malapportionment of seats in the House ofRepresenta-
tives and the less-powerful House of Councilors under the Public Office 
Election Law is an unresolved constitutional problem the political 
parties have chosen not to solve by legislative action. In 1976, the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the distribution of lower house 
seats in 1972.113 The degree of malapportionment was against ,require-
ments for equality under the law and universal adult suffrage, and 
against the prohibition on discrimination against any particular 
candidates for public office. 114 (Candidates, for example, who must get 
twice as many votes as candidates in another district in order to be 
elected are suffering a form of discrimination.) But the court invalidated 
neither the election nor the subsequent actions of the malapportioned 
Diet, as requested by the plaintiffs. In 1975 the Diet added twenty seats, 
bringing the total to 5 I I ; 11 5 but the apportionment as of the December 
1976 general elections were also challenged, in two cases decided in 
1978. The first decision, handed down by the Tokyo high court, 116 
upheld the constitutionality of the apportionment; while the second, 
much more widely supported, 117 struck it down as a violation of the 
Article 14 requirement of equality under the law. Both holdings were on 
appeal to the Supreme Court before October, I 979, when the next lower 
113 Kuroka v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Minshu 223 (Sup. Ct., Grand 
Bench, April 14, I 976). See 'Recent Developments,' Law in Japan: An Annual 9 (I 976): 
151-2. 
114 Constitution of Japan: 
'Article I4. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social 
status or family origin .... ' 
'Article I 5· The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to 
dismiss them. 
'2. All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group 
thereof. 
'3. Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public 
officials. 
'4. In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be 
answerable, publicly or privately for the choice he has made.' 
'Article 44· The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be 
fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social 
status, family origin, education, property or income.' Itoh and Beer, Constitutional Case 
Law of Japan, pp. 258-g, 261. 
115 Law 63 of I975 added twenty seats to the House of Representatives, and created 
new election districts in Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa, areas severely afflicted 
with malapportionment. 
116 Hanrei JihO 902 (November 2 I, 1978): 24-34 (Tokyo high court, September I I, 
I978). 
117 Koshiyama v. Election Commission, Hanrei Ji!W 902 (November 21, I978): 34-51 
(Tokyo high court, September 13, I978). 
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house election was held. 118 The apportionment as of the I979 elections 
was challenged, and the apportionment as of the subsequentjune 22, 
I98o elections is also expected to be challenged. Some LDP leaders have 
expressed their disagreement with the 'one man-one vote' thinking 
behind the I976 and I978 judgments of unconstitutionality and the 
repeated challenges; but opposition politicians also see a threat to their 
political positions in change. 119 In September I 978, the apportionment 
caused discrepancies in the effective weight of a vote, depending on 
election district, ranging up to 3· 74 to I in the lower house and 5·3 I to I 
in the upper house, with I representing the minimum weight. 120 The 
interplay of the Supreme Court and the Diet on the malapportionment 
issue will merit close attention in the I 98os. 
In addition, a November I979 district court decision raised the 
spectre of japan's imperial past in sentencing two radicals to death for 
killing eight and injuring close to 200 people in a series of bombings 
between I972 and I975, and for plotting the assassination of the 
Emperor. Although neither law nor constitution recognizes any differ-
ence between attempted murder of the Emperor and of an ordinary 
citizen, the presiding judge raised political hackles by suggesting, to 
many, a basic difference in holding the conspirators 'had a firm intent to 
assassinate the Emperor, the symbol of the unity of the people ofjapan, 
with bombs.' 121 
On balance, however, despite political and judicial problems, the 
second modern constitutional revolution ofjapan is likely to be guarded 
with vigilance by substantial forces in the public and private sectors. In 
Bonn, Matsuyama Yukio, international journalist with the Asahi 
Shinbun, put well the hopes of many Japanese: 122 
We want to be peaceful, and we want to remind you that japan is next to none 
in her love of freedom, after having enjoyed its sweetness in these recent years. 
·And we will not have it taken away by any government of any form. I still 
remember being deeply impressed with President Kennedy's remarks on his 
visit to the Berlin Wall, when he said, 'Ich bin ein Berliner.' He meant, of course, 
118 Asahi Shinbun, September 7, 12, 13, 14, 17, and October 30, 1978. 
119 Asahi Shinbun, September 27, 1978. 
120 Sources cited supra, n. 118. 
121 Tokyo district court, November 13, 1979; Asahi Shinbun, November 13 (evening 
edn) and 14, 1979; The Japan Times, November 16, 1979. On the face of it, the judge was 
merely stating a fact and quoting the constitution, but the fact that it was made into an 
incident is another example of the supersensitivity, among many opposition politicians 
and opinion purveyors, of the issue of the Emperor. 
122 Yukio Matsuyama, 'What Has Been Changing in Japanese Politics and What 
Not?,' unpublished speech, Trilateral Commission, Bonn, West Germany, October 23, 
1977, pp. g-1o. 
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that he was a free man, dedicated to liberty. And I still remember being deeply 
impressed by Martin Luther King, when he raised a vision for all mankind and 
said, 'I have a dream.' For man to be free and at peace with his neighbors. 
/have a dream that the day will come when I shall be able to say to the world at 
large, 'Ich bin ein Japaner.' And the world will know that such is a man who tries 
to keep his liberty through peaceful means. 
I share those hopes for Japan, and believe that constitutional 
democracy will probably continue without further constitutional 
revolution, barring a severe economic dislocation, the resurgence of 
extreme nationalism, or a holocaust. The reasons for optimism in 1 g8o 
are that competing constitutional structures and some values of 
Japanese law and society give substance to such hopes, and that the 
balance of political forces for and against stable Japanese-style democ-
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